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Zuckerman: Right to Jury Trial

RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
United States ConstitutionAmendment VI:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartialjury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed ....
New York ConstitutionArticle 1, Section 2:
Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been
guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain
inviolateforever ....

COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Rosen'
(decided April 3, 2001)
Defendant, Harry Rosen, pleaded guilty to first-degree
sexual abuse of a child after he put his hand beneath the skirt of a
four-year-old girl and fondled her. 2 Rosen appealed his conviction
and claimed that his federal and state constitutional rights were
violated when he was adjudicated a persistent felony offender 3 as
'96 N.Y.2d 329, 752 N.E.2d 844, 728 N.Y.S.2d 407 (2001), cert. denied, 122
S. Ct. 224 (2001).
2 Id. at 332, 752 N.E.2d at 845, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
3 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10 (McKinney 1998) defines a persistent
felony
offender as:
(a) A persistent felony offender is a person, other than a
persistent violent felony offender as defined in section 70.08,
who stands convicted of a felony after having previously been
convicted of two or more felonies, as provided in paragraphs
(b) and (c) of this subdivision.
(b) A previous felony conviction within the meaning of
paragraph (a) of this subdivision is a conviction of a felony in
this state, or of a crime in any other jurisdiction, provided:
(i) that a sentence to a term of imprisonment in excess of one
year, or a sentence to death, was imposed therefor; and
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Rosen raised two
defined by New York's Penal law.4
constitutional objections on appeal. Specifically, Rosen argued
that he was deprived of his due process right to a jury trial when he
was adjudicated a persistent felony offender following a hearing
Rosen
pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law Section 400.20.
further alleged that his rights were violated when the court applied
the discretionary persistent felony offender statute to his conviction
in the indictment, rendering it
but failed to include the charge
6
"jurisdictionally defective.
The maximum sentence for first-degree sexual abuse is
seven years, however as a condition of accepting the plea, Rosen
was informed he would receive a lesser sentence of three to six
years. 7
The pre-sentence report included a court ordered
psychiatric evaluation of Rosen. 8 The prosecutor, relying on
evidence contained in the pre-sentence report and psychiatric
evaluation, sought to have Rosen sentenced as a persistent felony
offender due to his prior sex-related convictions. Adjudicating
Rosen a persistent felony offender permitted the court to impose a
sentence beyond the seven-year maximum for first-degree sexual
abuse. 9 The New York Supreme Court gave Rosen an option to
withdraw his plea of guilty, and informed Rosen that if he was
subsequently pronounced a persistent felony offender following a
hearing, it would consider the prosecutor's application to increase

(ii) that the defendant was imprisoned under sentence for such
conviction prior to the commission of the present felony; and
(iii) that the defendant was not pardoned on the ground of
innocence.
(c) For the purpose of determining whether a person has two
or more previous felony convictions, two or more convictions
of crimes that were committed prior to the time the defendant
was imprisoned under sentence for any of such convictions
shall be deemed to be only one conviction.
4 Rosen, 96 N.Y.2d at 333, 752 N.E.2d at 846, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
5 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.20(2) (McKinney 1994) provides in pertinent
part: "When information available to the court prior to sentencing indicates that
the defendant is a persistent felony offender ...the court may order a hearing to
determine (a) whether the defendant is in fact a persistent felony offender, and
(b) if so, whether a persistent felony offender sentence should be imposed."
6 Rosen, 96 N.Y.2d at 333-34, 752 N.E.2d at 846, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
7 Id. at 332, 752 N.E.2d at 845, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
8 id.
9
Id.
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the sentence. 10 Defense counsel argued for specific performance
of the initial plea agreement, however, the court, sua sponte,
vacated the plea and sent the matter to trial."
Following a trial, Rosen was convicted of first-degree
sexual abuse and endangering the welfare of a child.12 Thereafter,
pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law § 400.20(5), 13 the
court held a hearing to determine whether Rosen should be
sentenced as a persistent felony offender.' 4 Based upon Rosen's
two prior felony convictions, which caused the court to qualify him
a persistent felony offender, Rosen was sentenced to 25 years to
5
life for the abuse count and one year for the endangerment count.'
On appeal to the New York Court of Appeals, Rosen
contended that his federal and state constitutional due process
rights were violated by the sentence enhancement provisions set
forth in § 70.10 and New York Criminal Procedure Law
§ 400.20(5); to wit, that due process guarantees inherent in the
Fourteenth Amendment mandate a factual determination by a jury,
based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, prior to imposing or
increasing a sentence beyond the statutory maximum.1 6 Rosen
claimed that pursuant to the Due Process Clause contained in the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,' 7 an
10Id.

I Rosen, 96 N.Y.2d at 333, 752 N.E.2d at 845, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
2
' 1d.
13

N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.20(5) (McKinney 1994) states in pertinent

part:
Upon any hearing held pursuant to this section the burden of
proof is upon the people. A finding that the defendant is a
persistent felony offender, as defined in subdivision one of
section 70.10 of the penal law, must be based upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence admissible under the
rules applicable to the trial of the issue of guilt. Matters
pertaining to the defendant's history and character and the

nature and circumstances of his criminal conduct may be
established by any relevant evidence, not legally privileged,
regardless of admissibility under the exclusionary rules of
evidence, and the standard of proof with respect to such
matters shall be a preponderance of the evidence.
4 Rosen, 96 N.Y.2d at 333, 752 N.E.2d at 845, 728 N.Y.S.2d
at 408.
"5Id. at 333, 752 N.E.2d at 846, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
16Id.

17

at 333-34, 752 N.E.2d at 846, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 409.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall any State

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
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accused is protected against conviction "except upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged."' 18 Rosen further maintained that his
state and federal constitutional rights were violated because the
indictment did not contain the persistent felony offender charge,
thereby rendering the indictment jurisdictionally defective.' 9 The
Court of Appeals rejected both arguments. 2 °
On appeal, Rosen focused his claim on the rule of law
articulated in Apprendi v. New Jersey.2' In particular, Rosen
claimed that the application of the persistent felony offender
sentence enhancement conditions violated his right to a trial by
jury.22 In Apprendi, the defendant fired several bullets into the
home of an African-American family that had recently relocated to
a predominantly all-white neighborhood. 23
The defendant
admitted that even though he did not know the occupants of the
house personally, he committed the shootings because the family
was black and he did not want them in the neighborhood.24 A
grand jury indicted Apprendi on multiple offenses, none of which
referred to New Jersey's "hate crime" law. 25 After pleading guilty
to three counts, an evidentiary hearing was held on the issue of
Apprendi's "purpose" for the shooting. The judge concluded that
the evidence supported a finding "that the crime was motivated by
racial bias," and found "by a preponderance of the evidence" that
Apprendi's actions were taken "with a purpose to intimidate" as
provided by New Jersey's "hate crime" statute. 27 Apprendi then
challenged the hate crime sentence enhancement on the ground
18 Rosen,

96 N.Y.2d at 334, 752 N.E.2d at 846, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 409.

"9Id. at 335, 752 N.E.2d at 847, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 410.

20 Id. at 334, 752 N.E.2d at 846, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
2 Id. at 333, 752 N.E.2d at 846, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 409 (citing Apprendi v. New

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)).
22

23

24
25

Id.

Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469.

id.
Id. at 468-69. The New Jersey statute provided for an "extended term" of

imprisonment if the trial judge finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
"the defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an
individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap,
religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West
Supp. 2000).
2 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470.
27
1Id.at 471.
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that it violated his rights to due process under the United States
Constitution. 28 Rejecting Apprendi's constitutional challenge to
the statute, the trial judge sentenced him to an enhanced term of
imprisonment. 29
The issue in Apprendi was "whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a factual
determination authorizing an increase in the maximum prison
sentence for an offense from 10 to 20 years be made by a jury on
the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 30 The United States
Supreme Court, relying on Jones v. United States,3 1 reversed the
decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey. In Jones, the
Supreme Court held that under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth
Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases
the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.32 With the exception for prior convictions, the Apprendi
Court followed the rule promulgated in the concurring opinions of
the Jones case which stated: "It is unconstitutional for a legislature
to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the
prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is
exposed. It is equally clear that such
facts must be established by
33
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The facts of Apprendi are similar to the instant case, but
can be distinguished. In Apprendi, the New Jersey statute provided
for a mandatory sentence enhancement if the trial judge
determined that a defendant committed a crime with the requisite
hateful intent enumerated in the statute. 34 This procedure violated
the defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights,
because the Court found "facts regarding bias" to be an essential
element of the crime that therefore must be proved to a jury
28 id.
29

id.

30

d. at 469.
3 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
32

Id. at 243 (emphasis added).

33 Id.at 252-53 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. at 253 (Scalia, J.,

concurring).
34 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 492 (reasoning that the statute required the factfinder
to examine the defendant's mens rea to determine whether he acted with a
"purpose to intimidate" on account of, inter alia, race).
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2002
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beyond a reasonable doubt.35 In Rosen, the defendant challenged
the court's procedure for determining a persistent felony offender,
arguing that it should be established by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt, and not merely be a determination made by the trial judge
by a preponderance of the evidence pursuant to Section
400.20(5).36 While this argument was the basis for reversal in
Apprendi,37 it was fatally flawed in Rosen. The Due Process
clause of the United States Constitution "protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged., 38 In Rosen, it was the defendant's prior felony
convictions that subjected him to the enhanced sentencing, not an
element of the crime charged, and as such he fell within a clearly
stated exception to the rule articulated in Apprendi.39
When applying the New York law, a court must determine
that the defendant had previously been convicted of two or more
felonies resulting in sentences of over one-year. 40 Once the
convictions are established by a preponderance of the evidence, the
court then considers other factors such as the defendant's history
and character in order to determine whether the enhanced sentence
should be levied. 4 1 Thus, the sentencing court is only carrying out
its duty to determine an appropriate sentence within the statutory
guidelines.42 As such, Rosen's constitutional due process rights
were not violated by depriving him of a jury trial to establish the
facts of his prior convictions, as the convictions did not constitute
an element of the crime charged.43
Rosen's second contention was that his state and federal
constitutional rights were violated because his indictment did not
include the charge of persistent felony offender." The New York
Court of Appeals again relied on Jones where the United States
35 id.

Rosen, 96 N.Y.2d at 334, 752 N.E.2d at 846, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497.
38 Rosen, 96 N.Y.2d at 334, 752 N.E.2d at 846, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 409 (quoting
36

37

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970)).
39 id.
40 Id. at

334-35, 752 N.E.2d at 847, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
at 335, 752 N.E.2d at 847, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
42 Id. (see, People v. Farrar, 52 N.Y.2d 302, 305-06, 419 N.E.2d 864, 865,
437
N.Y.S.2d 961 (1981)).
43 Rosen, 96 N.Y.2d at 335, 752 N.E.2d at 847, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
4'Id.

44Id.
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Supreme Court held that facts regarding "recidivism increasing the
maximum penalty need not be so charged., 4 5 The Rosen court also
cited Oyler v. Boles,46 in which the Court held that a defendant will
be given adequate notice that an enhanced sentence may be
imposed if the state utilizes the statute after the conviction, but
prior to sentencing.47 Therefore, in the instant case, Rosen was not
deprived of his constitutional due process rights because he was
notified by the trial court of the possibility that he may be
adjudicated a persistent felony offender before the imposition of
his sentence."
In conclusion, federal and New York constitutional
guarantees are similar with respect to a defendant's right to a jury
trial. The due process rights ensured by the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, 49 as well as the New York
Constitution, 5° protect a defendant from being convicted unless all
elements of the crime charged have been proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.5 ' The New York Court of Appeals in Rosen
determined that adjudicating the defendant a persistent felony
offender was not an essential element of the crime charged, and
therefore did not need to be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.52
New York's statutory scheme for adjudicating a
defendant a persistent felony offender fell squarely within the
exception to the rule promulgated in Jones.53 The Jones rule
requires that any fact, other than a prior conviction, which
Id. (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 248).
46 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
47 Rosen, 96 N.Y.2d at 335, 752 N.E.2d at 847, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 410 (quoting
45

Oyler, 368 U.S. at 453).
"I d. at 332, 752 N.E.2d at 845, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 408.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
49

committed ......
'oN.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 2. Art. 1, § 2 of the New York Constitution provides
in pertinent part: 'Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been
guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever."; N.Y.
CONST. art. 1, § 6. Art. 1, § 6 of the New York Constitution provides in
pertinent part: "In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be

allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel...."
51 Rosen, 96 N.Y.2d at 334, 752 N.E.2d at 846, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 409.
52 id.
53id.
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enhances a sentence beyond the statutorily prescribed maximum,
must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.5 4 The statute at issue in Jones was a federal statute, but the
Apprendi Court opined that the Fourteenth Amendment commands
the same answer when a state statute is involved. 5 Accordingly, a
defendant has no federal or state constitutional due process rights
to a jury trial if the sole purpose is to establish the facts of prior
56
felony convictions.
Additionally, Rosen's argument that his indictment was
defective because it did not include the discretionary persistent
felony offender enhancement provisions was equally without
merit. 57 The Court of Appeals of New York again looked to
decisions from the United States Supreme Court and determined
that a defendant need not be charged in the indictment with the fact
A
that recidivism may increase the maximum penalty.58
defendant's federal and state constitutional rights will not be
violated if he is given notice of the potential enhanced sentence
after the conviction but before the sentencing. 59 As a result, both
of defendant's arguments on appeal were constitutionally
defective, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed his
60
conviction.
Evan M. Zuckennan

54

Jones, 526 U.S. at 243, n. 6.

U.S. at 476.
Rosen, 96 N.Y.2d at 335, 752 N.E.2d at 847, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
57
id.
58 Id. (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 248 and Oyler, 368 U.S. at 453).
556 Apprendi, 530

59

Id.

60Id. at

336, 752 N.E.2d at 847, 728 N.Y.S.2d at 410.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss2/18

8

